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Perceiving the affective valence of objects inﬂuences how we think about and react to
the world around us. Conversely, the speed and quality with which we visually recognize
objects in a visual scene can vary dramatically depending on that scene’s affective content.
Although typical visual scenes contain mostly “everyday” objects, the affect perception
in visual objects has been studied using somewhat atypical stimuli with strong affective
valences (e.g., guns or roses). Here we explore whether affective valence must be strong
or overt to exert an effect on our visual perception. We conclude that everyday objects
carry subtle affective valences – “micro-valences” – which are intrinsic to their perceptual
representation.
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INTRODUCTION
While grabbing a coffee mug from the cupboard a phone call
diverts your attention and, in the split second before answering
the call, you select a seemingly random mug from your collection.
What factors guide you to choose one mug over the others? Here
we answer this question by proposing that the majority of physical
objects around us possess a subtle valence – a “micro-valence” –
which ranges inmagnitude but is always present.Although it is cer-
tainly the case that others have made similar proposals (Lang et al.,
1998; Cunningham et al., 2004; Barrett and Bar, 2009; Colibazzi
et al., 2010), themajority of valence studies have focused onobjects
with strong valence (e.g., guns or roses). More importantly, to the
extent that everyday objects automatically evoke some perception
of valence, valence can be considered a higher-level object property
that connects vision to behavior. In this sense, aswith other higher-
order properties of objects,we suggest that valence is automatically
perceived and incorporated into the mental representations of
objects (Figure 1). One implication of this claim is that “standard”
models of object perception may need to be rethought (Ungerlei-
der and Mishkin, 1982; Serre et al., 2007). Moreover, by exploring
high-level, functional object properties such as valence, we gain
a better understanding of how our perceptual system translates
visual information into tangible cues for behavior.
Assigning affective values tomental constructs is not a new con-
cept. Social psychologists have been investigating“attitude objects”
for decades (Fazio et al., 1986, 1995; Bargh et al., 1992; Greenwald
et al., 1998; Giner-Sorolla et al., 1999). Attitude objects can be
conceptualized as a person, place, concept, word, or thing that is
readily associated with a particular attitude from memory (e.g.,
associating “fox hunting” with cruelty, or “yoga” with peaceful-
ness). Although related, our conceptualization of micro-valence
differs in that we are not focused on individuals’ cognitive atti-
tudes to concepts, but rather on the mechanisms underlying how
the visual system computes affective valence from perceptual rep-
resentations. Thus, valence is not a label or judgment applied to
the object postrecognition, but rather an integral component of
mental object representations. While one might argue that valence
is too abstract to be considered an object property, we should note
that higher-order properties such as material (Cant and Goodale,
2007; Cant et al., 2008), category (Grill-Spector and Kanwisher,
2005), and function (Beauchamp et al., 2002) are also inferred
from multi-modal and non-perceptual sources.
Research investigating the links between affect and perception
most commonly relies on object, face, or scene stimuli that gen-
erate strong, well-deﬁned valences (Greenwald et al., 1998; Avero
and Calvo, 2006; Calvo and Avero, 2008; Rudrauf et al., 2008; Col-
ibazzi et al., 2010; Weierich et al., 2010). In contrast, few studies
have examined how more subtle valences are perceived in com-
mon objects (e.g., lamps, clocks, or coffee cups; McManus, 1980;
Giner-Sorolla et al., 1999; Rentschler et al., 1999; Duckworth et al.,
2002; Bar et al., 2006; Bar and Neta, 2007). Of late, studies exam-
ining weaker valences in the form of the value placed on everyday
objects, such as snack foods (Constantino and Daw, 2010; Kra-
jbich et al., 2010; Litt et al., 2011), have been arisen due to interest
in “neuroeconomics.” Still, studies relying on extreme responses
to highly affective stimuli remain our primary source for under-
standing the role of affect in perception and cognition. Although
critical for outlining the core components of affective processing,
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we suggest that the ﬁeld should take a more ﬁne-grained look at
how subtle affective valences inﬂuence our everyday perceptions
and interactions with the world.
Affect itself is commonly deﬁned along two continuous dimen-
sions: valence (pleasantness) and arousal (activation;Russell, 1980;
Russell and Carroll, 1999; Barrett, 2006). With respect to micro-
valences we are primarily focused on the single dimension of
valence. Although this approach assumes that valence is continu-
ous, we should emphasize that there are still notable differences in
the intensity of and the variance in one’s responses to strongly and
weakly valenced objects, for example, a bloody weapon and a cof-
fee mug. A bloody weapon will prompt a highly intense affective
function
material
related objects
grasp
valence
depth
color
FIGURE 1 | A common, everyday object and variety of high-level object
properties that may be components of its mental representation.
response in most individuals and the between-subject variance for
these strong responses is expected to be relatively low. That is, the
vast majority of us will experience the same highly negative feeling
when viewing such a negative stimulus. In contrast, a coffee mug
will likely generate a weaker or more subtle response, which we
refer to as that object’s micro-valence. This valence is described
as “micro” because the intensity of the response is less than the
bloody weapon or other similarly strongly affective objects. How-
ever, this weak intensity should not be confused with a weak effect.
There are many small, yet robust effects, for example Sternberg’s
(1966) classic digit memory search exhibited an effect of less than
40 ms per an item in memory (Sternberg, 1966).
THE PREVALENCE OF VALENCE
Affective valence is highly prevalent in our visual environment.
That is, objects in a scene prompt the perception of valence
that varies in strength and intensity along the valence contin-
uum (Figure 2A). As mentioned, while construing valence as a
continuous dimension is not a new idea (Russell, 1980; Russell
and Carroll, 1999; Colibazzi et al., 2010), many theorists have
focused on strongly valenced objects at the extreme ends of the
continuum1. Here we focus on the subtle differences in micro-
valence for objects nearer to the center of the valence continuum.
We posit that observers perceive a subtle valence for objects even
in the region immediately surrounding neutral. That is, everyday
objects such as chairs and clocks possess a micro-valence and so
are either slightly preferred or anti-preferred. Indeed, when the
1By way of comparison,when researchers working within the framework of attitude
objects refer to a continuum they are typically referring to the continuous relation-
ship between associated strength and automaticity (Fazio et al., 1986). This means
that attitude objects vary in the level of associated strength between the attitude and
the “object.” This continuous relationship is then used to predict the speed that an
attitude can be automatically activated from memory.
A
B
FIGURE 2 |The valence continuum in (A) illustrates the
dimension of valence ranging from strongly positive (red) to
strongly negative (blue). As indicated by the dashed gray line,
objects perceived to have a valence close to the neutral point on the
continuum are nonetheless regarded as having a micro-valence. In
(B) the portion of the continuum encompassed by the gray line in
(A) has been expanded to represent a ﬁner-grained continuum. The
ordering of objects here reﬂects this expanded continuum, albeit with
lesser magnitudes (the ordering of objects in this ﬁgure is derived
from Lebrecht andTarr, 2010).
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scale at the center of the continuum is expanded we expect it to
be organized much like the larger continuum, the only difference
being the overall magnitude of valence is weaker at the center than
at the extreme ends (Figure 2B; Lebrecht and Tarr, 2010). Note
that this model does not preclude the presence of some objects
happening to fall exactly at the center point of the continuum and
therefore giving rise to a truly neutral perception of valence.
While micro-valence only accounts for a small absolute region
of the valence continuum, it is integral in the automatic per-
ception of objects. As such, “micro” valences are a big issue for
understanding visual perception. That is, while it is undoubt-
edly the case that explicating the processing of strongly affective
objects is useful in anchoring how affect and perception might
interact, we rarely encounter blocks of gold or blood stained
weapons in everyday life. Even if we are to acknowledge that
valence functions along a continuum whereby subtle valences are
possible, further research is necessary to elucidate the characteris-
tics of the subtle valences that populate the central region of this
space.
UNDERSTANDING THE ORIGINS OF MICRO-VALENCE
Understanding how everyday objects acquire a micro-valence
forms a critical aspect of our theory. During perception visual
objects evoke a rich set of information (not necessarily affec-
tive), including properties that are not an intrinsic feature of the
percept or the percept’s larger category. For example, seeing an
object can automatically activate an entire network of informa-
tion from memory (Bar, 2007). This network is derived from both
contextual experiences (Bar et al., 2008) as well as conceptual or
semantic knowledge (Martin et al., 1996; Haxby et al., 2001; Pat-
terson et al., 2007). An operational example of this idea can be
seen in the efforts by historians to tell the history of the world
in only 100 objects (Schama, 2010): by selecting and describ-
ing key objects that elicit a wide range of associations, historians
were able to evoke critical periods in history. For example, one
particular object, the Roman Samian Bowl (Balmuildy Fort,Anto-
nine Wall – second century AD), was bright red, engraved with
human, animal, and ﬂoral ﬁgures. The bowl, made in a work-
shop in France, was thought to have been used at banquets for
Roman ofﬁcers and other high status individuals. The informa-
tion attributed to this object told a story of craftsmanship and
Roman rule in France in 200 AD. Historians regard objects as loci
of archival information acting as an access point for vast quantities
of knowledge and experience. In much the same way,we perceive a
richer network of information than that immediately available in
the percept. Our perception of any common object automatically
accesses a large network of information in our memories – valence
is only one component of a wide array of information, including
semantic and conceptual information that arises during object
perception.
It is these associations, spontaneously reactivated during per-
ception, that help form what becomes an object’s micro-valence.
For example, the principle that the contextual experience with an
object informs the micro-valence is evident in the micro-valence
of telephones: phones that resembled those used in the bedroom
were rated as more positive in valence than phones were used in
the ofﬁce (Lebrecht and Tarr, 2010). Moreover, these and other
micro-valence ratings obtained in our studies have been found to
be consistent both within and across observers, thereby indicat-
ing that micro-valence is more than random variation around a
neutral mean (Lebrecht and Tarr, 2010).
What makes the derivation of micro-valence much more com-
plex is that we have typically seen an object in many different
contexts and with a variety of individuals, all of which will con-
tribute to the affective memories or associations that become
automatically reactivated during visual object perception. Micro-
valence is the aggregate of this information plus, as discussed
below, valence-relevant perceptual object properties. This cumu-
lative valence – the contextual component being accrued over
our personal experiences – determines, in part, whether a given
object is ultimately preferred (having positive micro-valence) or
anti-preferred (having negative micro-valence).
Supporting this framework, there is strong evidence suggest-
ing that individuals rapidly attribute valence information to
objects, which then inﬂuences subsequent perceptions (Zajonc
and Markus, 1982; Murphy and Zajonc, 1993; Duckworth et al.,
2002; Ghuman and Bar, 2006; Bliss-Moreau et al., 2008). Such
ﬁndings indicate that individuals are able to associate affective
information with objects, which can then bias perception at a later
point in time.
THE PERCEPTUAL COMPONENTS OF MICRO-VALENCE
Although micro-valences appear to be “high-level,” there is evi-
dence suggesting that low-level visual properties contribute to an
object’s perceived valence. That is, visual features such as shape,
curvature, color, material, and symmetry may add to an object
being perceived as positive or negative independent of affective
associations.
Experimentally, this question has been addressed by examin-
ing novel objects for which there are few pre-existing associations.
For example, when making rapid “gut reaction” judgments partic-
ipants consistently prefer curved over sharp or jagged objects for
both familiar and novel objects (Bar et al., 2006). Other studies
have observed that participants can make valence judgments on
simple shapes (McManus, 1980; Rentschler et al., 1999; Bar et al.,
2006). At the same time, several studies report more reliable rat-
ings for real-world images as compared to abstract shapes (Vessel
and Rubin, 2010), indicating that experience-based associations
are dominant in forming valences.
More plausibly micro-valences arise from an integration of
visual properties and learned associations. Moreover, these two
attributes may potentially interact in that it may be easier to
form positive associations with objects already possessing “pos-
itive” perceptual features. Consider that an observer might more
readily generate positive associations with a shiny, curved, sym-
metrical teapot, whereas the same observer might more readily
generate negative associations with a dull, angular, asymmetric
teapot. Conversely, there is some evidence that this interaction
between perceptual features and associations may also function
in reverse: data to suggest that color preference might sometimes
arise from the degree to which an individual prefers an object with
a particular color, so that participants would be more likely to pre-
fer green to yellow if they prefer apples to bananas (Palmer and
Schloss, 2010).
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BEYOND VALENCE
It is our view that valence should be construed as a property of
object representations.As such,valence contributes to and is corre-
lated with, but is not equivalent to, either aesthetics or preference.
With respect to the former, object valence is closely related to
visual aesthetics. Whereas we are focused on the singular dimen-
sion of valence in perception, aesthetics can be broadly deﬁned as
a discourse of how works of art are judged to be beautiful across
different eras (Baumgarten, 1750; Ramachandran and Hirstein,
1999; Kirk et al., 2009). Thus, how our visual system evaluates
objects or images as positive or negative may contribute to aes-
thetic experience, but cannot account for its entirety. Valence
therefore can be considered but one aspect of aesthetic experi-
ence. More closely related to micro-valence is the emerging ﬁeld of
everyday aesthetics (Mandoki, 2007; Saito, 2007), which addresses
the ramiﬁcations of making aesthetic judgments on everyday envi-
ronments, for example, the ecological impact of maintaining lush
green lawns because they are aesthetically pleasing.
As with aesthetics, it is our perspective that valence is but one
component of preference, and not actually preference per se. Pref-
erence is deﬁned at the level of behavior (Lichtenstein and Slovic,
2006). For example, if you select a cappuccino over an espresso
you are held to have a preference for cappuccinos. By the time
you reach this level of behavior an array of mental processes have
been deployed: the object has been perceived, the relative valences
of objects in the scene have been computed, these valences have
been compared one’s current goals and motivations in the spe-
ciﬁc context (Constantino and Daw, 2010; Krajbich et al., 2010;
Litt et al., 2011), and these factors are combined to produce the
current “value” of the objects (Rangel et al., 2008; Grabenhorst
and Rolls, 2011). Only then can an individual make a decision
and in doing so exhibit preference. As such, perceiving valence
in objects is only one component of preference formation and,
although valence and preference are often highly correlated, they
are not the same mental construct. For example, a person may
perceive one cell phone to possess a more positive micro-valence
than the other, yet may ultimately buy the cell phone with the
negative micro-valence because it has better features. Within our
framework, valence is a positive or negative property of object rep-
resentations that is computed automatically by our visual systems,
whereas preference is an active choice behavior.
DISCUSSION
The functional signiﬁcance of objects with strong valence is highly
intuitive; we dislike objects that indicate danger, threat, or disgust,
such as angry tigers or moldy food, and we like objects that indi-
cate sustenance or pleasure, such as appetizing food or attractive
mates. But why have we also come to automatically evaluate the
valence of everyday objects that appear neither threatening nor life
promoting?
We contend that micro-valences function to optimize our abil-
ity to either select or orientate toward objects with a positive
micro-valence and away from those with a negative micro-valence.
Throughout the day we make multiple unconscious decisions:
whatmug to use for ourmorning coffee,what pen to signwith, and
what bottle of water to purchase. We suggest that these decisions
are facilitated by micro-valences computed during perception,
which we can use to reduce uncertainty and/or to orientate toward
some objects and away from others.
Not surprisingly, these issues have not been lost on the product
design and marketing communities. For example, Donald Nor-
man, an expert in the psychology of product design, has argued
that affective properties, or in our terms, micro-valence, enhance
the usability of particular objects (Norman, 2003).
In summary, we contend that our perception of the world is
always colored by our experiences and predispositions. We are
social creatures that, through a variety of contextual experiences,
create a visual world animated with affect. As observers we must
decode the multitude of perceptual, affective, and semantic infor-
mationpresented toour senses. To solve the affect part of this equa-
tion we evaluate the valence of all visual objects across the scene.
Much in the same way that we automatically perceive the shape,
size, or color of objects, we cannot help but perceive the valence
in objects. In this sense, valence is not a label applied after the fact
to perceptual entities, but rather is an intrinsic element of visual
perception with the same mental status as other object properties.
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